What today are the most important elements of Poland's national security policy?
Poland finds itself in a totally new situation as we approach the new century. I once said—paraphrasing Gen. Charles de Gaulle—that by joining NATO, Poland proves the old saying that while geography cannot be changed, geopolitics can. And we are doing this now. Entry into all existing European structures is Poland's basic goal. Only in this way can potential or real threats be diminished and opportunities increased. This entails having roots deep in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. We believe that joining NATO is joining a structure that, for half a century, has served Europe well and provided security for all its members.
At the same time we are aware that Poland is entering an organization itself going through changes. This means that it is vital for us to define our role within NATO and seek to guarantee that its borders remain secure, not only through alliances but also through stable relations with all our neighbors.
Poland today isn't a powerful nation and notions of making it neutral have emerged. Is this worth considering?
I'm skeptical about any scenario involving a neutral Poland. The idea of a neutral country deriving profits from non-participation in any military structures (as a safe place for the world's bank deposits, for example) is an illusion. In order to be neutral, a country has first to obtain a guarantee of neutrality from other countries. Poland treats the future realistically and therefore did not ask for such guarantees.
It should be remembered that, although the world has ceased to be dominated by a bipolar security structure, it will not remain unipolar forever. I think the present situation is of a temporary character; what counts in the global system is not only the possession of nuclear weapons, particularly in a situation where an increasing number of states have them, but also economic and demographic factors, and natural resources. I think that future will show what kind of multipolar structure appears in the 21st century, where apart from the United States, a global role will be played by the European Union—Europe as a power. But then a competitor in Asia and in Latin America will arise. So it's a structure where Poland has to find its place.
Has Poland a role to play today in the European and global arrangement of forces?
While affirming that Poland is not a large country, I would also say it's not a small one either. It's not an issue of national megalomania, but a proper evaluation of Poland's own place, and the range of its international responsibility. Poland, as a member of large structures—the European and Euro-Atlantic ones—can also play the role of a country with a sense of responsibility for the Central European region. It's an expression of the policy of solidarity when Poland supports the idea of NATO as an open alliance, so that after Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic, other countries can enter it. We think that all the willing Central European countries should have an open way into the Alliance. We act as a supporter of order in the region.
In his last book, Zbigniew Brzeziƒski wrote that Poland is not a partner in the game; I think you shouldn't under-appreciate the autonomy of different pawns on the chessboard and fail to notice the role Poland plays now, with its deep roots not only in European values, but also in democratic structures. Poland is a role model for the region more than ever; it's an example of a successful transformation as a result of which we have left the world of political relations based on dependence on the Soviet Union and entered a world in which freedom means the possibility of achieving economic success and national independence.
Does that mean you oppose the concept of Poland as an object and believe, at least in the regional dimension, it plays the role of a subject?
If Poland were not playing the role of a subject, it would mean not taking advantage of an opportunity it is facing at the end of the 20th century. Such an opportunity has appeared after almost 500 years: Poland in the 16th century was a subject in international politics, in European politics; Poland on the eve of the 21st century in becoming such an active subject.
After Poland joins NATO, will Polish foreign policy still contain such important elements as participation in different European institutions, with the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) in first place, as well as participation in less formal relations, sometimes called "geometric" structures?
Geometry is a metaphorical reference to contemporary politics and indeed, Poland is part of the largest number of European "geometric figures." The examples of model cooperation involve the Weimar Triangle (Poland-Germany-France), as well as the Visegrad Triangle (Poland-Hungary-Czech Republic) which now, after Slovakia's entry, is returning to the original form of a quadrangle. These are not just systems of temporary reference; they rather grow out of a certain community of interests of the countries which attach importance to valuable relations with Poland.
I am convinced that in the course of European integration, the Weimar Triangle may play the same role as was played by the partnership of Germany and France at the creation of the European Communities. Now, the cooperation of Germany and France with Poland may be a driving force, a vehicle for further extension of the European Union.
NATO is a union of national states and not a newly created structure. Within NATO, however, there exist certain orientations of interests, expressed in, for example, the clearly promoted Mediterranean policy. In an extended NATO, the important factors of the region's security will include, for example, Baltic cooperation.
Polish politicians think that the Alliance will also benefit from Poland's membership; could you explain that?
Philanthropy is rarely present in politics: States or their alliances usually don't do things only because they're good deeds. Their actions rather express their interests. Poland's joining NATO constitutes an element of change in the character of the Alliance. So far, it has been a defensive alliance, a Cold War structure. It had an antagonist and knew who it was defending against. After the collapse of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, there have been suggestions that it should be followed by dissolution of NATO. That reasoning was grounded in the fact it was an institution of an another era.
NATO's expansion proves that the Alliance can perform new functions in a new situation. Upon entering NATO, Poland is contributing certain space, which is significant in the framework of military operations, but if the NATO interest would only be pushing the eastern danger away from its borders, I think there would be no Polish interest in that. On the contrary, that would be opposed to Polish national interests.
On the other hand, NATO's expansion creates a situation in which the alliance may become a stabilizing structure in the region. The fact it has so far provided security to its members is its asset; now NATO is facing a completely new situation. This challenge is answered by a new strategic concept, [to be] formulated at the Washington summit [April 1]. We are very active in working on it, not only because Poland is itself an important partner in the dialogue, but also because it has accumulated historical experience related to the region.
The question to be faced by all the structures of European and Euro-Atlantic integration is the issue of relations with the European east—with Russia in the first place. I think that in this area our partners from NATO expect Poland's active and creative participation. Finally, it shouldn't be forgotten that Poland has a demographic and military potential that should not be overlooked; it's the most serious partner in the region and it's in NATO's interest to grant Poland membership.
Does that mean that Poland's joining the Alliance is to some extent a completion of the vision of 21st-century NATO?
I believe so. I think that if that element didn't exist, our attempt to enter NATO would not succeed. I have taken part in many discussions in different circles, and I have also talked to American circles who don't welcome NATO expansion. They were never satisfied with the argument that Poland has the right to join; they always wanted evidence that NATO will benefit from it. The main advantage was Poland's geographic location. Geopolitics isn't a favorite area in European political thought, but one of its lessons is that over the centuries, the fate of Europe—and so, of the world—has been decided in the region where Poland is. It's the heart of Europe, and any attempts to ignore it didn't work well for either Poland or its partners.
Entering NATO is not a moment of self-satisfaction. It's first of all an unusual challenge. Being a nearly 40-million nation is not enough; we have to prove that we indeed can be a partner translating potential into power, including military strength.
So you would agree with the statement that joining the Alliance is a beginning, and not the end of the road?
It's the end of a certain road, but we are only at the threshold of an another historical process. Its framework calls for liquidating the dramatic difference in living standards between Poland and countries that have been NATO members for a long time, and for modernization of the Polish army. Poles have long memories; when in the 18th century the Sejm refused to finance the army, later Poles had to pay for foreign armies stationed on their land. It has been a good lesson. I think that we can count on social support for the modernization of army.
Does your knowledge as a historian tell you that Poland has a better key for understanding the Eastern European problems than its partners in NATO?
We are trying to persuade our Western partners on that point. But we have to say honestly that we are in a situation where different scenarios are possible. I don't want to talk about the unpredictability of the development of a large country, about the scenario of a certain possible development, of extrapolating from a situation we know from history. Simply, at the moment the condition of the Russian state is hard to define. And that's where the experience, the knowledge of the country, its mentality and history come in handy. It's said that only historians should be futurologists, because the only future we can predict is the future grounded in history. Poles can remember the political relations in the early 17th century, when Russia was overwhelmed by smuta [the political chaos of the interregnum], a time of anarchy and irresponsibility; they can remember the consequences and possible reactions to that situation.
But it's important that at present Poland can stabilize its relations with Russia. That might sound like a paradox because anti-Russian sentiment is widespread in Polish society, but still, Poland regained independence 10 years ago, it freed itself from dependence on the Soviet Union, and after a few decades of political, military and, to a significant extent, economic subordination, it was able to become independent and at the same time establish friendly relations with this neighbor. In my opinion, this is a success for Poland.
What is the Polish vision of the 21st-century NATO?
NATO is and should remain first of all a defensive alliance, in which the states get united in an act of solidarity as formulated in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty, in order to provide each other assistance in case of attack. It's the power of solidarity that erases the threat of a conflict. Second, NATO is already now playing the role of a stabilizing force. Over the last 50 years NATO has never had to fight a war. Now, NATO is playing a military role in the Balkans, the eternal area of European anarchy, where in the past local conflicts would transform themselves into the biggest threats for Europe. And NATO proved to be the only effective force in case of Bosnia, and now in Kosovo.
During Poland's leadership of the OSCE [in 1998], this organization, which was also established for the needs of the Cold War, won an important international role; and one of the elements of that role was our proposal of full cooperation with NATO. And so, the organization, which was born out of the initiative of two Cold War powers, the organization which later would be a great instrument of Soviet policy, and which today is one of the few organizations in which Russia has maintained its significant position, has asked for cooperation with NATO—and succeeded. The largest OSCE operation in Kosovo was undertaken under an agreement-contract with NATO.
The question the Alliance is facing now is how it is to function in the 21st-century world. The first proposal is to make NATO an institution of global order, playing the role of a law-enforcing body, a police force. Because the United Nations has problems with launching military operations, NATO seems an excellent alternative. This issue is subject of debate on NATO strategy in the 21st century. In my personal opinion, NATO could play that role only under authorization from the United Nations, which is the only body granting moral and political power for such operations.
Meanwhile, in the Euro-Atlantic region NATO may be an effective peace tool, one that remains grounded in the values contained in the U.N. Charter, and not in the decisions of structures created after the last war. To put it simply, it would be hard to understand [a situation in which] all the decisions in NATO actions within the Euro-Atlantic home were dependent on a Russian or Chinese veto. That's why I think in the new system of global order, NATO will fulfill defense functions for its members and stabilizing functions in the whole Euro-Atlantic region. I think that NATO's success results first of all from the fact that it turned out such a political force it didn't have to use military power. The existing military potential played a political role and wasn't an instrument of violence.
You mentioned the role of Poland in the region; are there any clear responsibilities resulting from it?
One of the big successes to which Poland contributed was the fact that overcoming a certain international order was carried out peacefully. That means not only the Round Table talks [between Solidarity and the communist authorities in 1989, leading to free elections and the first postwar noncommunist government] but also the instant "disappearance" of all Poland's neighbors—the German Democratic Republic, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union. They were replaced with seven new states, and Poland has established friendly relations with all of them, and not only by means of treaties.
The relations with Ukraine are the best example. In the past, the two countries were separated by a river of blood, by centuries of conflicts. Then, Poland became the first country in the world to recognize Ukraine's independence. That resulted from Polish experience, going back as far as to the words of Marshal Józef Piłsudski who said there could be no independent Poland without an independent Ukraine. That was in the 1920s, in a situation where Ukraine had never been independent before and its chances for that seemed slim—but time proved that Piłsudski was right. The normalization of Poland's relations with its neighbors is a positive lesson showing our country can play a stabilizing role in the region.
At present, the great Central European ailment is a lack of consequence in the transformation process. British sociologist Ralf Dahrendorf said that this process is like passing a vale of tears. Poland has already passed it, and with success. Today its economic success and political stabilization are more than ever an example for other countries in the region. But at the same time, it has to be stated openly, that in a Central Europe comprising many small countries, Poland may raise some fears among its neighbors, as a large country among small ones. There arises the fear of a certain hegemony by Poland. Even the metaphor of Poland as a bridge between the West and East for some observers is a reflection of the Polish idea of Poland being a Messiah of nations, which could be expressed through and realized by a strive for hegemony. But nothing could be farther from Polish intentions.
However, Poland is facing a challenge—of supporting other countries while not being the distributor of funds. Money stays with large financial powers and big international organizations.
So is the role of a stabilizing element and exporter of a certain model of transformation feasible [for Poland]? I am convinced it is. Poland may reply positively to this challenge, especially thanks to its experience with how to do it. When we talk about this in the region's countries, we find listeners who are easy to convince. The question remains whether this experience has an importance for Russia. When I visited Moscow, I was asked why the transformation process is completed in Poland but is failing in Russia. The only answer I could give was that Poland experienced a moment of enthusiasm about regained independence and was able to invest that enthusiasm in the economy.
That enthusiasm didn't exist in Russia because it had lost something: It ceased to be one of the great superpowers, the imperial system collapsed and no economic or personal freedoms could balance that. Russia lost control of this part the world and that's why it couldn't use the initial capital of the transformation process that Poland had. In all other Central European countries liberated from communism, the Polish example is seen as showing the regained freedom and independence should be invested in transformation.
On your way back from the United States, after submitting the NATO ratification documents, will you have the feeling of returning to a safer country, both externally and internally, which stems from membership in a group of states where certain internal standards are maintained?
In regard to external safety, that's certain, I have no doubts. NATO gives Poland a feeling of security that it probably has never had in its history. However, entering NATO is only the beginning. We are not expected to have a particular political model; such limitations were imposed by the Warsaw Pact, where, it's said, the only victory was the invasion of Czechoslovakia. For NATO it's not a problem that Italy is governed by a communist; the important issue is that the fundamental civic freedoms, democracy, political freedom and so on are maintained.
Still, NATO doesn't guarantee that we'll be able to secure ourselves internal peace: The rest depends on us. However, the feeling of security results also from an attachment to stabilization, and in this sense Poland's NATO membership is significant for internal peace in the country.

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