When communism collapsed in 1989, Poles had to cope with and introduce changes in virtually all aspects of public life. Muddling through those summer months after the June elections that produced a stunning victory for Solidarity-backed candidates, Poland underwent a crash course in how to build a democracy from scratch. Now, on the eve of its admission to NATO, it seems to have passed the course—though a number of exams had to be taken repeatedly.
The Solidarity movement, which at its height embraced 10 million Poles only to be crushed by martial law on Dec. 13, 1981, nevertheless bore fruit nearly a decade later. The underlying strength may have even surprised some of its own supporters. Their consistency— strengthened by the support of home-grown Pope John Paul II—was one of the main factors that led to the historic Round Table talks with the ruling communists, held in Warsaw between Feb. 6 and April 5, 1989. They resulted in a decision to organize general elections for June 4, in which 35 percent of the Sejm members would be chosen through free elections and the rest from lists composed by the communist authorities, while all 100 members of the new Senate would be directly elected. The results astounded everyone: Solidarity candidates swept every mandate for which they were eligible except for one Senate seat.
That was the beginning of democratic life in Poland. The political scene erupted with close to 300 parties and organizations, some of them earning the disrespectful name of “sofa parties" because their entire membership could fit on a couch. Even some of the larger parties succumbed.
Apart from the trial-and-error associated with finding and retaining political support, many issues sharply divided the political scene, even—perhaps especially—within the opposition camp which comprised people of different political leanings, from the left to the right, until now united in fighting the communism. The first rift concerned the election of Gen. Wojciech Jaruzelski, the author of martial law, for president. That provision had been agreed upon during the Round Table talks. The National Assembly formed on the basis of this agreement elected the general, but only by a razor-thin one-vote majority.
When Gen. Czesław Kiszczak failed to form a cabinet in that summer of 1989, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, a Catholic intellectual and one of the Solidarity leaders, became Poland's first non-communist prime minister in Poland in more than 40 years on Aug. 24. The opposition had learned its lessons quickly: Solidarity leader Lech Wał´sa cobbled together an alliance of Solidarity with two former communist-allied parties, the United Farmers' Party (ZSL) and the Democratic Party (SD), and declared that they were capable of “forming a government of national responsibility." Mazowiecki's cabinet and he himself enjoyed the support of a vast majority of the society, driven by unrealistic hopes for overnight improvement of living standards. However, it also affiliated a handful of communists, including those who headed the security-related ministries of Internal Affairs and Defense. Many Poles didn't like the idea, but voted their support believing it was the only way to neutralize the former ruling elite.
The presidential elections of 1990 established yet another inconvenient precedent. Jaruzelski's presidency was a result of political compromise, but it was contrary to popular will. The public dissatisfaction led to the decision to stage another presidential election, this time a direct one, on grounds the Sejm's choice was not fully legitimate as 65 percent of it had been “appointed." At the same time, controversy swirled over whether a president chosen by means of general elections should not have more significant powers than the figurehead post Jaruzelski held. And if this were not enough, the 1990 presidential elections rendered the first crack in the united opposition, when Wał´sa found himself competing against his former political adviser, Mazowiecki. The Solidarity camp was divided into the Center Alliance (PC), supporting Wał´sa, and the Citizens' Movement Democratic Action (ROAD, later the Democratic Union), affiliating Mazowiecki's allies.
As Finance Minister Leszek Balcerowicz's “shock therapy" of far-reaching economic reforms began to take hold in late 1990, public discontent had been growing. This was personified in the rise of Stanisław Tymiƒski, a businessman of dubious reputation from South America who, thanks to his demagogic statements and promises of instant wealth, managed to beat Mazowiecki in the first round of the 1990 elections. He was trounced by Wał´sa in the second leg, but the political lessons were not lost on Poland's fast-maturing electorate.
After becoming president, Wał´sa appointed in January 1991 a new prime minister, Jan Krzysztof Bielecki, head of the Democratic-Liberal Congress. He found it difficult to implement his business-oriented economic policies and was replaced 11 months later by Jan Olszewski. His efforts to carry out vetting among the political elites caused the collapse of the government, which meanwhile had neglected economic reforms. The key event in the downfall was the release by Olszewski's Minister of Internal Affairs, Antoni Macierewicz, of a list of alleged informers for the communist-era special services. Critics argued the files were often incomplete, and often suspect because they could have been forged by agents. Olszewski argued, in turn, during a Sejm speech that the state was threatened by treachery and on the verge of collapse. But the whole affair was too much for Wał´sa, whose name was said to be on the list; he dumped the Olszewski government.
Thus another crucial political lesson was learned, the hard way, about working together. The often-feuding Solidarity-rooted parties which were represented in the Sejm managed to form a coalition, although it excluded Olszewski's supporters. The gathering consisted of such diverse organizations as the Democratic Union (the Freedom Union of today) and the Christian-National Union (ZChN). The former was a liberal coalition, while the latter was a tradition-oriented, conservative Catholic grouping. The new prime minister, Hanna Suchocka, was somewhere between these two political views: she belonged to the more conservative wing of the Democratic Union.
Lessons forgotten
The lessons learned about political cohabitation were soon forgotten. After slightly more than a year in office, Suchocka's government was toppled by Solidarity deputies unhappy with certain government policies. President Wał´sa was forced to call early parliamentary elections for September 1993. The results were a heavy blow to the Solidarity-rooted parties.
Up to then, the Solidarity-based groupings had managed to deal its own hand, or occasionally work with the Polish Peasants' Party (PSL), thus marginalizing the former communists, the majority of whom had reformed and joined the Social-Democracy of the Republic of Poland (SdRP). The SdRP formed a coalition in 1991 with some smaller satellite organizations and trade unions from communist times dubbed the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD). However, people with communist past, who at some point in their lives chose to abandon the people's republics elites, were to be found in close on all political parties after 1989. In the 1993 elections, the SLD collected 20 percent of the vote, which was enough to enable it to form a coalition government with the Peasants. The Solidarity camp was defeated because it once again forgot the lessons of post-1989 and had disintegrated into a vast number of groupings that were unwilling to form any coalitions and thus failed to reach the 5 percent threshold of popular support needed to sit in parliament.
A period of cohabitation began. The post of prime minister went to Waldemar Pawlak, a taciturn young activist of the PSL. It was the second time at bat for Pawlak. In 1992, Wał´sa had given him the task of forming a government, but after 33 days of unsuccessful attempts, Wał´sa replaced Pawlak with Suchocka. This time he succeeded and the government was formed in October 1993.
The Pawlak government failed to complete its four-year term due to internal rifts. In March 1995, Pawlak was replaced by Józef Oleksy, the first premier to come from the ex-communist party, the SdRP. He lasted less than a year, until February 1996, when he was forced to step down after Andrzej Milczanowski, the Minister of Internal Affairs appointed by President Wał´sa, accused Oleksy of close ties with a Soviet spy. The charges were not proven, but the damage was done; he was replaced by Włodzimierz Cimoszewicz.
Another victory for the left came in 1995, when Wał´sa ran for another five-year term as president. He lost to SLD head Aleksander KwaŒniewski, who had been planning his U.S.-style campaign since 1993, when he deliberately withheld from taking up any positions within the government.
The SLD seems a fast learner as it took them merely four years to undergo a thorough reform and win all that was a t stake: it became the largest grouping in the Parliament, it enjoyed having its own Prime Minister and the President.
Lessons relearned...
By the next round of parliamentary elections in 1997, the Solidarity camp had learned its political lessons well, too. More than 30 right-wing parties banded together in Solidarity Election Action (AWS) and came first in the balloting, forming a coalition with the Freedom Union (UW). The coalition was headed by professor of chemistry and longtime Solidarity veteran, Jerzy Buzek. AWS creator Marian Krzaklewski, who had replaced Wał´sa as the Solidarity leader, seems set to follow KwaŒniewski's footsteps. He is avoiding government posts while preparing for a run at the presidency in 2000.
Despite the decade of political infighting, there is one feature which seems extremely well entrenched. All major political groupings agree as to the guidelines of Poland's foreign policy: membership in NATO as well as the European Union, and a strong position in Central and Eastern Europe combined with excellent partnership relations with its neighbors.
The first ten years of democracy have brought about tremendous and irreversible changes, both in state institutions and in societal attitudes. Almost all major parties know the importance of economic policy. The change of power has become a common practice and is carried out smoothly in Poland, though rhetoric can still be sharp from both left and right. Nevertheless, Poland has come close to the classic form of three major groupings: the Social-Democrats (SLD), the liberals (UW) and the Christian Democrats (AWS). And it still has a strong fourth power, the PSL. In terms of Western Europe, the political settings only lack a typical Greens party, Poland's environmentalists' movement being weak and dispersed.

Tomasz Oljasz

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