One for All...
...And all for one. Poland's Representative at NATO and the Western European Union (WEU)
outlines his views on Poland's place in the world on the eve of her accession into the
alliance. In March 1999,
Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary will become members of NATO. Just 10 or so years
ago, this statement might have seemed pure fantasy. Today, it expresses foregone political
decisions. It testifies to the profound changes that have taken place in Europe,
especially Central Europe.
Poland's “five minutes" in the 20th century
For Poles, entry into NATO takes place on the 10th anniversary of the Round Table talks.
Ten years ago, a great political transformation began in Poland. It led to the
construction of a democratic state, a healthy economy and a sovereign foreign policy. The
invitation to the alliance is not only recognition of the internal changes made, but also
a step that radically changes Poland's international position.
The broad public acceptance of the revolutionary internal and external changes and their
consistent implementation by all of Poland's governments in the last decade undoubtedly
belong among the great common achievements of Poles. Winston Churchill once said that,
“there are few virtues that the Poles do not possess and few mistakes they have ever
avoided." This time, we did not make a mistake. We took good advantage of the five
minutes that history gave us in this century which was so difficult for us.
At the start of the century, Poland was missing from the political map of Europe. A fight
for independence was in progress. The 1920s and '30s marked the reconstruction of the
statehood regained after World War I. This great national effort was disrupted by the
tragedy of World War II, followed by half a century of restricted freedoms and an
artificial economy. In all, the 20th century has been “a search for freedom" for
Poles. The last decade of the century can be considered compensation for those difficult
years. In 1989 the country recovered its independence. Admission into the powerful
alliance of the democratic and most developed states in 1999 safeguards and protects
Poland's independence and creates a new setting for the operation of the Polish state.
Joining NATO is a strategic decision for Poland which meets with general public support.
It stems from a sense of values shared with NATO member states and a shared outlook on how
to ensure security in Europe. It is linked with a desire to erase those lines of division
which in the past pushed Poland and all of Central Europe to the peripheries of European
politics and economics and to the margin of Western political interest.
Sharing NATO's approach to European security
Poland's membership in NATO primarily provides a sense of security. This does not refer
to, however, a specific geographical threat. Poland does not have enemies today. It is not
in conflict with any of its neighbors. NATO grants protection from a whole range of
potential and changing risks. It is understandable that this covers dangers linked with
economic instability and political unpredictability east of Poland. However, the scope of
potential risk is much wider (including European conflicts and their consequences,
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their deployment, terrorism). Today,
participation in the alliance for both old and new members is not only determent and joint
defense against potential aggression, but a type of joint insurance policy designed to
protect them from many possible threats. Usually, one takes out such a policy not in fear
of one's neighbors, but of future, unpredictable dangers. The alliance is also a broader
and constantly developing strategy for European security.
In addition to joint defense against possible aggression, the alliance calls for the
integration of security policies to a high degree and the means of carrying this out. To
an extent, it means a “denationalization" of the security policy of member states.
Shared security interests and integrated military structures prevent a renationalization
of security issues. They call for working out a concept, in cooperation with other NATO
members, for the development and deployment of allied armed forces. They strengthen the
community of interests, joint activities and joint decision making. The great processes of
reconciliation taking place between nations in Europe, especially Franco-German and
Polish-German, would certainly be more difficult if NATO did not exist, replaced by
autonomous national security policies and military capacities.
The North Atlantic Alliance increasingly organizes European security. Maintaining an
effective capacity for collective defense, it embarked on an active policy for dialogue
and cooperation with non-NATO states. The purpose is to reduce the risk of conflicts,
deepen mutual understanding and trust, overcome crises and expand the possibilities of
real partnership in all European countries in solving common security problems. An
important instrument of this policy is the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program announced
in January 1994. It creates possibilities for political consultations between partner
states and the alliance, including situations when the partner sees a “direct threat to
its territorial integrity, political independence or security." The program
establishes practical cooperation in areas such as military planning, joint exercises and
the possibility of cooperation with NATO forces in peacekeeping and humanitarian
operations.
A major role in multilateral political consultations and practical cooperation is played
by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) covering 28 partner countries in addition
to NATO members. A special place is occupied by the Founding Act on Mutual Relations,
Cooperation and Security Between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in May 1997 and
the Charter for a Distinctive Partnership Between NATO and Ukraine signed in July 1997.
They create broad opportunities for the development of political and military ties between
NATO and these countries.
The policy of remaining open to cooperation with partner states was also seen in the
organization, by NATO—with considerable participation of non-NATO states, including
Russia and Ukraine, of international peacekeeping forces in Bosnia (IFOR followed by SFOR)
for the implementation of the Dayton peace treaty. A readiness to take on a similar
challenge was again expressed by NATO in the case of the Kosovo crisis—if an appropriate
peace treaty is signed and the parties in the conflict express willingness to accept
international forces. Poland fully shares NATO's broad approach to European security. This
is expressed by factors such as active participation in the Partnership for Peace and
EAPC, support for cooperation between NATO and Russia and Ukraine as well as substantial
participation in the international forces in Bosnia.
Overcoming the division of Europe
The admission of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO is also a major step on
the road toward overcoming the historic division of Europe. In fact, the gradual expansion
of existing Western European institutions and their developing cooperation with Russia
seems to be the only practical road toward building European unity. This division is not
only a matter of the last few decades. It has existed for much longer. For many, Europe
and European security problems were in essence limited to Western Europe. Further east
stretched “wild fields." Neville Chamberlain said in 1938 that it is “horrible,
fantastic and incredible" for British soldiers to die “because of a quarrel in a
faraway country between people of whom we know nothing." These words referred to
Czechoslovakia threatened by Nazi Germany. Today the security of Poland, the Czech
Republic and Hungary is becoming the concern of all NATO members. NATO expansion in the
future will increase the zone of security and stability in the region. It will create
better conditions for the effort of the region's nations to make up for the civilizational
arrears for which they are not wholly to blame.
For centuries, Central European nations were deprived of the right to self-determination.
They were treated instrumentally, forgotten and abandoned by Western democracies. However,
sacrificing Prague and Gdaƒsk did not protect Paris and London. The division of Europe
after World War II did not produce a lasting peace, but a threat of a nuclear disaster for
all of Europe. The inclusion of Central Europe into NATO expresses the belief that
European security should mean security of this part of the continent, as well. It means
the recognition of the new voice of Central Europe.
For centuries, Central Europe remained an object rather than a subject of policy, an
object of rivalry and an arena for wars conducted by surrounding superpowers. Nations
inhabiting the region were never able to forge strong mutual economic or political ties.
Quite the reverse, Central Europe remained at loggerheads and divided. Only the 1990s
brought strong—stronger than ever before—Central European thinking. For the first
time, concepts for cooperation in the region were carried out (the Visegrad Group, the
Central European Free Trade Association and the Central European Initiative). The current
inclusion of Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO is not only a change in
Central European thinking, but also proof of the recognition of the region's new status.
Permanent links with America
Polish, Czech and Hungarian membership in NATO also means the first ever alliance between
these countries and the United States and Canada. This means the direct involvement of
North America in Central European security and the consolidation of Euro-Atlantic links.
Safeguarding the United States' long-term involvement in Europe remains one of the canons
of Poland's foreign policy. Poland is convinced—based on the experience of two
wars—that the United States should remain “an European superpower." Its alliances
with Europe are the basis of the Euro-Atlantic community and the basic element of the
current European and global order. Central Europe will also be responsible for the
maintenance and shaping of these relationships.
Poland in the alliance
History does not end for Poland in March 1999. Poland has never looked at its membership
in NATO as the single and final goal of Polish foreign policy. NATO membership is part of
a larger push to create optimal conditions for Poland's development and permanent security
guarantees for all European nations. At the same time, Poland is aware that being a member
of NATO also involves taking on part of the alliance's responsibility and the obligation
to actively contribute to the implementation of its tasks.
Poland is bringing with it major military capacity to the alliance. This should help NATO
maintain its constant readiness to deter aggression. The Polish government is aware that
Poland's armed forces require far-reaching modernization. A plan for their development has
been prepared. Its implementation should lead to a reduction in the number of troops (to
about 180,000), but at the same time they will become more mobile and better equipped.
This will improve their interoperability with the forces of other NATO countries and
increase Poland's contribution to both common defense and other missions undertaken by the
organization.
Poland is ready to carry out NATO tasks in the prevention and solution of conflicts.
Poland is one of the largest contributors to international peacekeeping forces. The
participation of about 30,000 Polish troops in 29 peacekeeping operations and a number of
missions to date confirms Poland's strong sense of international solidarity expected by
the alliance as an essential feature in the implementation of such projects. The extensive
military experience gained by Poles in peacekeeping operations is accompanied by political
experience from the solving of conflicts, including the period when Poland led the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe in 1998.
Poland wants to contribute to NATO's activities for stability in the region. The
development of friendly relations and constructive cooperation with all of its neighbors
has remained one of the priorities of Polish foreign policy over the past 10 years. Poland
has built partnership relations with nations with which it shares a difficult past
including the Germans, Ukrainians and Lithuanians. Poland has contributed in a major way
to the construction of regional links and regional cooperation.
Poland's achievements in regional policy spoke for its candidacy to NATO membership. At
the moment, Poland wants to continue this policy with its NATO allies for the
implementation of shared objectives. Poland is aware of the fact that it will be a
valuable partner—not as an eastern bastion of the alliance, but as a participant and
co-creator of internal dialogue and cooperation with all the countries in the region.
Poland is ready to share its experience from participation in the PfP program in the
transformation and modernization of the armed forces and the development of ties with NATO
countries.
Poland has no intention of creating new divisions. Just the reverse, it wants to help
transfer to the East those values and principles which have brought the West success and
civilizational progress; it wants to help open Western structures to all those who want to
join them and meet the appropriate criteria.
Poland and NATO's future
Poland does not intend to limit its interest to the alliance's eastern policy. The
upcoming NATO summit in Washington will sum up the 50 years of the alliance's existence to
date. It will set the organization's tasks for today and the future. Of special importance
in this area will be the new strategic policy which will be adopted during the summit.
Work on it is underway, with Poland's involvement. Participation in this work is an
important part of Poland's integration with NATO. It allows Poland to find out what member
countries think of the alliance, and it also makes it possible to influence the future
shape of the alliance. Poland shares the opinion that the updated strategic concept should
fulfill two tasks. It should be a message to the citizens of both member and non-member
states about the alliance's place in the new European situation and about its goals and
responsibilities. On the other hand, it should create foundations for new political and
military planning.
For Poland, it is of key importance that the strategic concept strongly stresses the
alliance's function as an instrument of collective defense, in keeping with Article 5 of
the Washington Treaty. This is the main raison d'¢tre and the glue holding the alliance
together and a prerequisite for the successful implementation of other tasks. At the same
time, Poland shares the alliance's broad approach to security matters, including dialogue
and cooperation with non-NATO countries and activities designed to prevent conflicts as
well as the resolving existing strife. This also applies to operations exceeding the
framework of Art. 5. Poland proceeds from the assumption that such operations should be
undertaken in keeping with the rules of international law and be based on agreement and a
joint sense of responsibility for international security. At the same time, the alliance
should maintain the necessary flexibility and decision-making freedom.
Poland attaches much importance to the trans-Atlantic links in the new document. It
believes that permanent U.S. involvement in European matters is a precondition of
consistent and effective NATO activities. At the same time, Poland believes that strong
ties between Europe and the United States are not in conflict with aspirations toward the
development, as part of the alliance, of a so-called European security and defense
identity. Building this identity should help increase the responsibility and contribution
of Europeans as part of the alliance and help maintain trans-Atlantic links.
Of key importance to Poland is also the alliance's openness to the admission of new
members in keeping with Article 10 of the Washington Treaty. As far as the defense part of
the strategic concept is concerned, Poland believes a major portion of the document
remains valid. For example, Poland sees no reason to revise the provisions covering
nuclear policy.
Plenty of work ahead
Poland's entry into NATO was based on prerequisites to meet minimum military requirements.
However, this is only the beginning of adapting Poland's defense system to NATO
requirements and standards. The alliance's decision to gradually—over 1998—include the
invited states into the organization's work was extremely favorable for Poland. It
produced the first quasi-membership experiences; it made it possible to learn how NATO
works, the scope of problems covered and matters requiring solution on the Polish side.
The moment of Poland's formal entry into the alliance does not close the issue of Polish
membership; in fact it presents a whole series of tasks linked with membership. They apply
not only to the armed forces, but also to foreign policy, security services, the economy,
civil defense and other areas covered by cooperation in NATO. It should be remembered that
NATO is admitting the entire Polish state, not just its armed forces. Successful
implementation of these tasks is not to meet the expectations of the allies, but also to
determine Poland's place in NATO.
Andrzej Towpik
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